A culture of cooperation, which is the implicit reward from cooperating in any prisoner's dilemma and investment types of activity, and inclusive political institutions, which enable the citizenry to better select public-spirited representatives and check their decisions, are key for economic development. To foster research on the determinants and impact of these institutions, we illustrate a novel data set employed in [1] and [4] and gathering a measure of the activity of the Cistercians and the Franciscans, which is a proxy for the citizens' culture, and a constraints on the elite's decision-making power score, which is a proxy for the inclusiveness of political institutions, for a panel of 90 European historical regions spanning the 1000e1600 period.
Data
The main data set, which is reported in the "CI" excel file, consists of observations on a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions for 90 historical regions, part of 16 present-day European countries, for which we have sufficient geographic and institutional information for each halfcentury between 1000 and 1600. As illustrated below, we also report in the "Monasteries" excel file the location and starting and ending years of activity of each monastery used to obtain our proxy for culture.
Experimental design, materials and methods
As [10] , we construct each historical region by merging those neighboring NUTS 2 administrative units that, according to Ref. [9] , were part of the same polity for most of the 1000e1600 period (see Table 1 for the match between historical regions and medieval polities and [1] for the match between historical and NUTS 2 regions). This sample design considers as cross-section identifiers exactly the areas within which institutions were selected, since both the Cistercian and Franciscan provinces oversaw the expansion of the two monastic orders and roughly corresponded to the historical regions [7, 11] . We concentrate, moreover, on the first six centuries of the second millennium for three reasons. First, the within-country variation in political institutions significantly drops with the rise of the nation-state during the 19th century [1] . Second, the Protestant Reformation deprived Western monasticism of its pivotal role by stigmatizing ecclesiastic property and professional preaching [1] . Third, the 17th-19th centuries witnessed innovations making economic activities far more complex than those prevailing in our sample [1] .
Specifications Table

Subject area
Economics. More specific subject area Institutional Economics; Political Economy.
Type of data
Excel.
How data was acquired
By extracting from historical sources the location and activity of Cistercians and Franciscans monasteries in 90 historical regions between 1000 and 1600 and the functioning of the political process for the same sample.
Data format
Raw and aggregated.
Experimental factors
The sample has been selected based on data availability.
Experimental features
While a culture of cooperation is measured with the cumulated discounted number of years of activity of Cistercian and Franciscan houses per square km, the inclusiveness of the political process is proxied by the constraints on the elite's decision-making power score constructed following the Polity IV prescriptions and building on the events within a 40-year window around each half-century. Data source location 90 historical regions observed each half-century between 1000 and 1600.
Data accessibility
Data are with this article.
Value of the Data
The data can help understand the origins and impact of a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions. For instance, a key question is whether the negative short-run effect of crises on markets can be offset by their positive longrun impact on institutions.
Since [1, 4] document that the correlations between medieval and present-day institutions are strong but not perfect, an important avenue for future research is to identify more recent factors, like extractive policies [3] , shaping present-day institutions.
The data can be usefully employed to understand the drivers of the regional state capacity in medieval Europe [5] .
A culture of cooperation
The proxy for the citizens' culture is the cumulated discounted number of years of activity of Cistercian and Franciscan houses per square km, i.e., Culture (see Table 2 for the summary statistics of all variables). For each of the 699 (2979) Cistercian (Franciscan) houses and each half-century, this figure equals the difference between the number of years in which the house had operated and those elapsed from its possible closure per square km, if positive, and zero otherwise. Three observations are key. First, we rely on the number of years of activity of each house since we lack sufficient information on the number of monks working in each house. Second, the discounting emphasizes the importance of the monks' activities [8] . Finally, scaling the years of activities by the historical region's area rather by its population is key to correctly represent the diffusion of the two monastic orders since a minimum distance between houses was compulsory [1] . To obtain the raw data, which we report in the "Monasteries" excel file, we eliminate from the lists in Refs. [7, 11] the houses not listed in http://www. cistercensi.info/, http://users.bart.nl/~roestb/franciscan/and the references therein.
As discussed in Ref. [1] , both monastic orders dictated norms of respect and trust in exchange for guidance on how to share consumption risk, and under the threat of defecting, to the populations subject to highdbut not excessivedrisk of harvest destruction and, thus, more interested in obtaining their services. Given the homogeneity of the two monastic orders' group work and their unicity within Western monasticism [1] , Culture captures the input to the technology that transformed the citizens' interest in cooperating into evolutionarily stable norms, and higher values represent a stronger culture.
To emphasize the role of each monastic order, we also report the cumulated discounted number of years of activity of the Cistercian (Franciscan) houses per square km, i.e., Culture-C (Culture-F).
Inclusive political institutions
The inclusiveness of the political process consists of "the proportion of people possessing [the right to better select public-spirited representatives and check their decisions] and the degree to which they possess it" [2] . To gauge both these extensive and intensive margins, we construct the "constraints on the executive authority" score proposed by the Polity IV project, i.e., Democracy. To do so, we build on the events within a 40-year window around each date (see for details the Internet appendix of [1] ), and we code a score ranging between one and seven and assuming higher values when the policy-making power of the citizens vis-a-vis the elitedi.e., when the institutionalized constraints on the elite's decision-making power, whether individuals or collectivitiesdbecame more forceful [6] . The communities of Aragon and Cataluña, the "Giudicati" of Sardinia as well as the communes of Northern Italy, Table 1 Medieval polities, historical regions, and present-day countries.
first, and the Provinces and the Reign of England, then, witnessed the most robust rise in the inclusiveness of political institutions, even if they never became what we nowadays consider "democracies." [1, 4] . Table 2 Summary of variables.
Variables Definition and Sources Statistics
Democracy:
Constraints on the elite's power. Table 1 and observed each half-century between 1000 and 1600.
